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Should There Be Governmental Guidelines 
Bioethics? The French Approach 
by Catherine Labrusse-Riou* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
. In 
In France and throughout Europe, as in North America, the so-called bio-
genetic revolution and its myriad medical and other applications have spurred 
ardent debate from philosophical, ethical, political, economic, and legal stand-
points. This development has given rise to sometimes violent conflicts of doc-
trines and interests. 
Control over nature deeply upsets all our interpretations or representations 
of life and humanity in legal concepts. When Descartes depicted the human 
spirit as "master and possessor of nature," he allowed for a human and rational 
understanding of the world that did not exclude recognition of "the sacred." 
But modern science now holds the power to transform the world and humanity, 
and this constitutes a complete denial of "things sacred" because it eliminates 
all taboos. While this is normal, at the same time it is extremely uncomfortable 
to be shaken in the search for the ethical foundations of this power. When one 
can do anything, one no longer knows exactly what one should do. 
The choices that must be made, unless one is simply swept along by a move-
ment beyond the control of jurists, are difficult, to say the least. It is for this 
reason that the question of defining law for biogenetics and its applications has 
yet to be resolved in France. Indeed, this question remains the subject of 
extensive study. It is a broad question that has divided both lawyers and poli-
ticians. The former do not all share the same philosophy with regard to legis-
lative action, and the latter find it difficult to move away from political conflicts 
or daily interests in order to gain necessary distance. 
Creating law poses a problem in terms of method and strategy with regard 
to the appropriateness of legal rules within a parliamentary civil law system. 
Although several major decisions have already been handed down in this area, 
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social questions are not normally brought before the courts. The legislative 
problem, in terms of the content of the laws, supposes an intimate awareness 
of the relationship between ethics and the law-a precise evaluation of the 
values that one seeks to defend, promote, or arbitrate via the law. In the face 
of the development of biotechnologies and the social and cultural consequences 
of such research, however, no one yet has a clear vision of the best way to make 
these judgments. Furthermore, no one has put forth a global assessment of the 
risks, interests at stake, or conflicting values involved in the development of 
these techniques. 
In addition to these problems of analysis and choice, the international di-
mension further complicates matters. The universal nature of science and the 
economic market for technologies applied to the life sciences are confronted 
with the ethical, sociological, and legal pluralism of nations-the cultural wealth 
of humanity. How can this heritage be preserved against the reductive uniform-
ity of technology when it is humanity itself in its complexity and mystery that 
we are manipulating and manufacturing? 
To add further to the deep concern of both jurists and citizens, consider the 
sharp difference between the laboriously slow creation of law and the breakneck 
pace of scientific innovation-innovation which is not thought through before 
it is put into practice. Consider the freezing of in vitro embryos, which poses 
insolvable questions. Or take genetic diagnostics of human embryos, which 
render our law on abortion, in particular the legal limits of medically required 
abortions, either outdated or inadequate. 
Although the French Parliament has remained silent, and ministers have set 
bills aside while awaiting a social consensus that never comes, the government 
is far from disinterested in the problems posed by the creation of ethics or a 
body of law governing the life sciences. In 1983, the President of the Republic 
created by decree a national consultative committee on ethics for the life and 
health sciences, the National Ethics Committee. This official and permanent 
organization, of which I am honored to be a member, is unique in its pluralist 
composition. In addition to members from the scientific and medical commu-
nities, there are philosophers, lawyers, sociologists, and representatives of dif-
ferent social groups and religions. The Committee marks the first time that the 
milieu of medical research officially has been opened to and confronted with 
specialists and currents of thought from other fields. This has required inter-
disciplinary reflection in reaching decisions on the ethical questions posed by 
medical research and, more generally, the life and health sciences. 
The Committee, however, has only an advisory role. It submits recommen-
dations which are not binding upon those who put questions before it: the 
government, universities, researchers, doctors, or ordinary citizens. We have 
done a great amount of work over the past four years both in pragmatic terms, 
by answering questions put before the Committee as quickly as possible, and 
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also in theoretical terms, by preparing documents of a more philosophical 
nature. This latter part of our work is vital to establish the ethical justifications 
behind our recommendations and to maintain an independent and objective 
analysis of the cultural, scientific, and social stakes involved in biotechnologies 
and related research. I 
More recently, the French government asked the Council of State to study 
the need for legislation and the possible content of legislation in the areas of 
artificial procreation, genetics, human experimentation, the computerization of 
medical data, and the commercialization of human body products. This study 
has also covered the status and role of ethical committees, both locally, at the 
hospital or research unit level, and nationally, at the level of the National Ethics 
Committee itself. The scope of this assignment is vast. I have also had the honot 
of being asked to join the working group of the Council of State. This working 
group consists of jurists and will submit its report early next year. 2 On an 
international level, President Mitterand has insisted that the agenda for the 
annual conference of industrialized nations include these problems. On a more 
tnodest scale, the French government has delayed a statement of France's po-
sition within the Council of Europe until the Council of State delivers its report. 
Likewise, the director of the National Health and Medical Research Institute 
has decided to await the recommendation of the National Ethics Committee 
before stating a position within the European Medical Research Council con-
cerning human embryo research. The European Medical Research Council is, 
in fact, seeking to convince the European Parliament to revise its restrictive and 
prohibitive positions in its 1986 resolution. 
Thus, while we are far from defining positive legal solutions, we have begun 
the active search for these solutions; This search is difficult and not without 
conflict. It is difficult due to the vast and widely varying nature of the data that 
must be considered before making a legill judgment. And, it is difficult due to 
resistance from scientific and medical circles to any legal Intervention other than 
that which would legitimize their actions. Lastly, it is difficult due to the weak-
nesses of the law as an instrument for regulating existing practices within an 
atmosphere of conflict. The search for solutions is also subject to conflict since 
opinions are divided, interests are divergent, and the moral options or philos-
ophies of law are extremely diverse. 
While some promote a hands-off policy or feel that the law can accomplish 
nothing, I believe that lawyers must confront these difficulties and conflicts if 
they have any faith in the necessity and the virtue of law. I would like to give 
you a look at how I feel we must deal with these questions of law by examining 
I See RAPPORTS DU NATIONAL D'ETHIQUE (Documentation fran~aise 1984-1987). 
2 DE L'ETHIQUE AU DROIT, NOTES ET ETUDES DOCUMENTAlRES (Documentation fran~aise 1988). 
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three aspects of the question. First, I will examine the legal and cultural context 
of the relations that exist between law, ethics, and biomedical research, partic-
ularly the French view of these relationships. Second, I will discuss a number 
of basic questions posed by the legality or legal status of certain scientific 
practices. Third, I will discuss a number of institutional and methodological 
problems related to the development of biology and its multiple applications. 
II. THE LEGAL AND CULTURAL CONTEXT OF BIOETHICS 
With regard to the legal and cultural context, we must, as French biologist 
Henri Atlan has written, "think globally before acting locally." The current 
debate shows that any new legislative intervention in a given area, whether it 
be research on embryos, surrogate motherhood, genetic diagnostics, or trade 
in human products, first requires a period of global reflection. This reflection 
must cover the current state of positive law, the cultural and ethical stakes 
involved, and the difficulties of using the law to regulate the development of 
biogenetic sciences and technologies. 
The concern for coherence in a system of civil law makes it necessary to avoid 
legislation which is casuistic, which is not open to interpretation and adaptation, 
and which would prove incompatible with the general law or destabilize its very 
roots. In many respects, we suffer in France from a movement away from 
comprehensive codification and a breaking up of the judicial order into different 
disciplines which put forth contradictory solutions to the same questions. More-
over, the deficiencies in civil and criminal law regarding the status of the human 
body and the uncertainty of civil or private rights require philosophical reflec-
tion on the relationship between humanity and its own nature, on the right to 
dispose of one's body, and on the finalities linked to the exercise of this right. 
Such reflection must necessarily precede any choice of standards or rules. These 
choices lead to the examination of the major cultural and political stakes in-
volved in scientific development. I feel that there are three fundamental ques-
tions at issue. 
The first question is how, and with which rules or creative processes, can one 
construct an image of humanity and an image of our genealogical identity in 
the context of artificial fertilization that remains a human image? How can the 
essence of what is human and the transmission oflife be protected against being 
reduced to the organic species from which humanity first emerged or even to 
simple matter for industrial manufacture? How is one to advocate ethical values 
and legal concepts capable of imparting, without major risk, a human sense to 
the power of technology and sciences, when processes face us which make a 
human being no more than a material, using or producing humans as objects? 
The imperative of retaining respect for human dignity remains an unclear ideal 
which must be rendered concrete and endorsed, however symbolically. Human 
1989] GUIDELINES IN BIOETHICS 93 
life is not something that is simply produced; it must also be imbued with 
meanmg. 
The problem is that the definition or the frontiers which define human beings 
disappear when we are identified with machines. This is even more true when 
the machines become a subject, as has been suggested by an American jurist 
who proposed recognition of the legal personality of computers or machines 
with artificial intelligence. In a pluralistic society and a secular state, science 
risks replacing religion if the law remains silent or follows technological change 
without judgment. As we will see, the law governing the rights of persons is 
deeply affected, right down to the very conceptions that law has of the person. 
In France, the status of persons and, in particular, of filiation is not covered 
by subjective or contractual rights. This principle of the so-called unavailability 
of the status of persons, however, could be superseded by a concept of life 
having no standards which establish the existence of the human subject. Expert 
evaluations on a case-by-case basis replace general and impersonal rules that 
ensure equal application for all. These judgments establish bonds of filiation, 
but, if all the possibilities of science are considered lawful and freely negotiable 
according to one's individual desires, the multiplication of procreative tech-
niques may destroy these bonds. 
The second matter at stake is whether our societies are to govern or be 
governed by a technical-scientific power which brings with it as many advantages 
as it does risks, both individual and collective. The silence of law results in a 
transfer of power to the scientific community which is incompatible with dem-
ocratic principles. The law governing medical liability in this area is extremely 
deficient and poorly adapted, at least in France, to counterbalance the power 
of the medical sector. Is it necessary to legitimize every possibility open to science 
in the name of uncertain or ineluctable progress? Should we impose barriers 
and limits on members of the scientific community, on individuals who resort 
to their services, or on states themselves which employ science for ends which 
can be condemned from an ethical or social point of view? 
These questions bring us back to the foundations and the function of taboos, 
or prohibitions, within liberal and permissive societies. Such societies fear that 
the articulation of a public order and imperative rules will lead to a state-
controlled moral order. But these prohibitions can also benefit individual free-
dom, for example, by protecting women from the slavery of bearing children 
for others. They may also inhibit freedom, for example, if eugenic work leads 
to the justification, for reasons of public health, to bar someone from marrying 
or having children. 
The third question concerns the difficult reconciliation between individual 
liberties and collective interests in public health. The most visible example of 
this today is AIDS. Other cases are less visible but equally serious. For example, 
there are risks in the use of eugenics for individual preference in choosing the 
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sex of a future child. There are also collective risks: the interests of experimental 
research, the protection of the subjects of experiments and of medical or genetic 
data banks, and the protection of privacy or medical secrecy. In these areas of 
delicate judgment, Ftance has a number of specific rules, but we lack a general 
philosophy to serve as a guide in ambiguous cases. 
The consequences for the legal order are the confusion of its fundamental 
structures and values. In private law, the distinctioh between the legal status of 
a person, which defines the identity of the subject, and the individual rights of 
the human personality betomes unclear. For property law, this same confusion 
appears with the distinction in our civil code between three types of property: 
common gdods, which are not objects of property; public goods, which are the 
property of the state or public institutions; and private goods, which are objects 
of individual rights for the owner or the subject of private contracts. In pUbllc 
law, the problem is how to determirie the duties and rights of the state with 
regard to the human body. For these three general categories of problems, 
three sets of corresponding difficulties have emerged for the law in the search 
for appropriate ethical solutions. We cannot ignore them in a realistic discussion 
of the problem. 
The fitst difficulty requires that we partially renounce the reassuring distinc-
tion between scientific research, which is in principle free, and its applications, 
which may be subject to potential social or legal control. It is for this reason 
that Frante created the National Ethics Committee. The increasingly close ties 
between research and its applications have tevealed that, in order to avoid 
undesirable applications, society must control or prevent the research itself. For 
example, this applies to genetic research on in vitro embryos. In this case, the 
National Ethics Committee has prohibited genetic manipulation and profjosed 
a moratorium on genetic diagnostics. There is no certitude, however, thllt their 
recommendation will be honored. The difficulty lies in evaluating future risks 
which are by definition random and which research cannot quantify. Further-
more, while it is possible to control public reseatch, it is much more difficult to 
control commercial and industrial tesearch within private entities. Finally, for 
acceptable areas of research, the difficulty lies in correlating within the rules 
governing this research a respect for scientific standards and for eqmHIy nec-
essary ethical and legal standards. 
The second obstacle, related to the first, is the result of the powerful ties that 
exist between scientific research and the coihmercial marketplace. Business 
increasingly controls researchers, and science is no longer a free search for 
knowledge. As long as work is restricted to inett and inanimate materials and 
objects, legal categories remain intact. Persons and things subject to ownership 
remain clearly distinct. But when acts are performed on living beings who are 
subject to the laws of the market and economic profitability, everything changes 
from a legal standpoint. 
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It has become increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to prevent the market-
ing of a product, such as growth hormones, or to limit its use to strictly thera-
peutic applications. Although this decision may be socially or ethically prefer-
able, it is economically irrational. Furthermore, the combination of scientific 
and economic utility may restrict or set aside the ethical requirements governing 
researt:h on products or on human subjects. The economic pressure of the 
marketplace today has led to the consideration of human life as a subject of 
trade and has transformed the human being into an object. 
Economic pressure has prevented the creation of independent legal standards 
to govern the trade in these human products. These are the legal categories 
that are disappearing. This disappearance is manifest with the probable exten-
sion of patent law to genetically modified human cells. In France, it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to defend the principle that the human body is outside the 
realm of trade and, for example, that donated organs for experimentatipn are 
free and should not be relIlunenited except in certain cases. 
This principle of free donation, applied to blood and organs, should extend 
to all products of the human body. Since there is simply no justice in profits 
from free raw materials, the principle of free donation requires the establish-
ment of laws to govern the institutions or companies which manage, transform, 
and sell these products. 
Surrogate motherhood, which has known only limited development today in 
France and is most certainly illegal, poses two questions in a more crude and 
brutal fashion: whether a woman's body and a child can be sold as products, 
and whether a human being can be treated as an object in a contract. The 
French principle that the human body is nontransferable and is identified with 
the person guarantees the freedom of the individual from slavery, even if 
consented to voluntarily. This principle, nevertheless, has been subjected to 
difficult tests and requires that we establish the boundaries of taboos. Higher 
ethical values justify these boundaries to limit the freedom of trade and com-
merce. Here, the concept of individual freedom of consent, which is, for exam-
pie, inspired by generosity, finds itself opposed to the principle of solidarity, 
which is imposed upon individuals for the benefit of others. 
This brings us to a third difficulty resulting from the proliferation of subjec-
tive rights and the concept that individuals are free to do as they wish with their 
bodies. Within a medical and health context, the conventional criteria used to 
determine the legitimacy of medical acts reside in the distinction between normal 
and pathological acts and between acts of personal convenience and therapeutic 
acts. From a scientific standpoint, these criteria are increasingly difficult to 
define. Health is defined as the state of well-being. Nothing could be more 
subjective. Moreover, the extension of medicine outside the realm of treatment 
for pathological conditions is a social phenomenon that even the French health 
care system, notwithstanding enormous expenditures, is unable to control. 
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Thus, the social right to health care becomes unlimited, and individual freedom 
to seek medical attention becomes destructive to social equality. 
These difficulties are important because no one, not even one virulently 
opposed to science, is ready to give up the advantages of scientific development, 
the principles of free market economics, and the freedom of individuals to 
retain control over their lives. Any constraints imposed by law risk poor accep-
tance, noncompliance, or perpetual debate from an ethical standpoint. 
Yet we know very well that not everything is permissible, nor is everything 
possible. Given the pluralism of opinion, the risks for human dignity and for 
science, and the contempt for law, the law remains the best, or at any rate the 
least offensive, instrument for social regulation. But what law? What content 
should this law have? Who should articulate it and in what terms? 
III. THE LEGAL CONFLICT OF BIOETHICS 
This brings me to certain basic questions concerning the content of the law, 
legality, and the legal system. These questions are so numerous that I will limit 
my analysis to two examples that pose legal difficulties in a large number of 
countries. Despite their tentative nature, I will try to underscore the dominant 
trends that have become apparent in France today. 
The first question regards the legality of and the consequences for filiation 
of artificial fertilization. The second question concerns experimentation on 
human subjects, in particular, on human fetuses. 
Legislation has yet to address these questions for an extremely profound 
reason: lawyers find themselves faced with the need to break with their present 
tradition. Indeed, the legal or sociological positivism that continues to reign 
over our law faculties leads us, through a sort of legal utilitarianism or neutrality, 
to adopt purely technical and scientific attitudes, which are primarily relativistic 
from an ethical standpoint. The intellectual break thus requires that we again 
find the balance between realities which are not normative and must be created 
and values which give meaning to legal concepts or mechanisms. This is not 
totally impossible, or at least I do not believe it is impossible, and I would like 
to demonstrate this process with the two examples I have selected. 
Artificial fertilization is rapidly developing in France without a solid and 
coherent legal foundation. For artificial insemination, an efficient and uniform 
medical deontology is in effect at public hospitals. But these practices are subject 
to considerable debate concerning, in particular, whether to limit this technique 
to sterile living members of a heterosexual couple and whether to maintain the 
anonymity of the donors. For in vitro fertilization and the multiple forms of 
embryo transfer to persons other than the parents, there is no shared deontol-
ogy at public and private health institutions. As for surrogate motherhood, the 
majority of the French population disapproves of this practice, though certain 
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doctors encourage surrogate motherhood despite its civil illegality and criminal 
nature. 
Here, medicine is not attempting to restore an order that has been upset by 
sickness. Rather it is attempting to manufacture a human being to satisfy a 
desire. This initial transgression is something that can no longer be globally 
prohibited. We must, however, establish limits of legitimacy if we are to keep 
the status of the child and the fundamental rights of the individual from falling 
into anarchy and chaos. 
These limits of legality cannot be objectively deduced from the right of 
privacy. When covered by consent or generosity, the right of privacy permits 
any manipulation of life and any disarticulation of the human body. This leads 
to the uprooting of the genealogical order which civil law creates and the civil 
code formalizes. 
The difficulty with the freedom to procreate is that the law must interface 
with the act of procreation and thus violate an individual's right to privacy if it 
is to prevent the birth of children without filiation or with multiple filiation. 
Filiation, however, is in principle a question of law subject to public policy rules 
that define the role of will, but do not authorize all practices. The civil status 
of the child depends first and foremost on the law, rather than on individual 
desire. This is the meaning of our principle of "indisponibilite de l'l:tat des 
personnes." 
To fix the limits of legality for different techniques objectively, we must 
account for the consequences that would result from the total absence of legal 
interdiction. If nothing is illegal, the principal legal categories and structures 
of parenthood are subject to far-reaching changes without provision for a 
coherent and equitable solution to future problems. First, we must identify what 
must not be transgressed and then carry out legal practices judged to be tol-
erable-practices to which the law can and must adapt itself. 
With regard to prohibitions, surrogate motherhood, which constitutes the 
loan of the uterus by the genetic mother, should be illegal for three fundamental 
reasons. The first reason is to protect the rights of the gestating mother and 
the rights of the child as subjects, not as products or objects. The prejudice 
against the physical integrity of the woman is so great that legitimizing this 
prejudice will lead us to new forms of slavery. The child is also not something 
to be sold with a warranty against hidden defects as is common in contracts. 
The second reason is that these techniques lead to the production of children 
for adoption, which is usually a legal remedy against the abandonment of 
children. While society cannot prevent this phenomenon, society should not 
promote it either. Finally, prenatal adoption must not be recognized, because 
no objective and real criteria can guide a judge in the appropriateness of his or 
her decision as long as the child is not born. Either the decision will be totally 
arbitrary, or it will result from the opinions of psychologists, doctors, and other 
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experts who have no legitimate right to decide the legal bonds of filiation for a 
child still unborn.3 
Legal reasons also lead me to condemn artificial fertilization for single parents 
or homosexual couples. In both cases, the child will be deprived of two-parent 
ties. The ability of so-called illegitimate children, however, to impose the estab-
lishment of their filiation through legal action in the absence of voluntary 
recognition by the father marks a major judicial step forward. A desire for a 
child conditioQed upon the exclusion of the other parent denies the child's 
rights and is not ~thically acceptable. Enough children have been deprived of 
a parent by misfortune. We should not deliberately premeditate this misfortune. 
One could, of course, reveal the identity of the dQnors, but this would reduce 
filiation to the transfer of genetic property without parental intention and with 
no, or at best occasional, ties with the father and the mother. Filiation would 
thus become not a human lirik, but the pure product of technology. 
The techniques of procreation that must be accepted and organized are the 
donation of sperm and ova for medical reasons or for the benefit of a living 
couple; This supposes a choice for or against the anonymity of the donors. I 
feel that anonymity is preferable in order to avoid a resurgence of as yet unseen 
forins of polygamy, polyandry, or incest that our familial system is incapable of 
managing without major risks. 
This means that confidentiality must therefore be tbtal and medical respon-
sibility extremely strict. This also means that one must partially waive the criteria 
of biology for the determination of filiation and prohibit, without upsetting the 
balance of general law, the disowning of offspring, especially in paternity ac-
tions. These adaptations in the law of filiation must be accompanied by medical 
and social regulatory measures and by disciplinary measures that the deorito-
logical practice cannot define alone. 
This brings us to experimentation. Are laws necessary here, or is professional 
deontology sufficient? There is no general legislation in France governing ex-
perimentation on human subjects. Such experimentation is subject to frag-
mentary rules, to deontological rules for new types of therapy, to regulations 
for administrative authorization for marketing of new medicines, to civil and 
criminal law in the event of offenses committed during experimentation, or to 
the general principles of international charters defined since the Nuremburg 
trial of Nazi doctors. The National Ethics Committee has prepared directives, 
and, in general, local committees within hospitals have examined protocols 
governing experimentation. This situation is not fully satisfactory and many 
observers feel that a general law should set forth regulations in this area and 
provide for penalties in addition to purely professional discipline. 
'French jurisdictions including the Conseil d'Etat, the Cour d'Appel d'Aix en Provence, and the 
Tribunal de Grande instance de Creteil have recently decided this way in 1988. 
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A certain number of conflicts arise from this need for law. Certain members 
of the scientific and business communities want a law that is extremely permis-
sive, particularly with regard to consent of the subject. They feel that the 
scientific and collective interest, as precisely measured by experts, is more im-
portant than the voluntary participation of subjects. Others want either to 
prohibit experimentation without personal benefits or at least to limit it strictly 
by defining legal limits. Remuneration of subjects is another subject of dispute 
between idealists and realists. It is probable that an honorable compromise can 
be reached and translated into law with regard to the essential conditions 
governing experimental acts. The major trends are, first, toward requiring 
consent of the subject, and, second, toward requiring the partial return of the 
research benefits to the community or to the public interest. 
There is less certainty of a consensus on the experimental use of human 
embryos, which in vitro fertilization has made accessible. Here, the conflicts are 
extremely sharp, Some state that the abortion law justifies treating the embryo 
as an object. Others, remaining faithful to Kantian morality, refuse to consider 
the embryo simply as a means to an end. Finally, there are others who challenge 
the interests of medicine and cite the risks of such eugenic research. 
In France, we refuse the utilitarian concept of the "pre-embryo" employed 
in Great Britain to justify research up to fourteen days after conception. The 
National Ethics Committee, following extensive worl<., has published a complex 
and, in the final analysis, fairly restrictive opinion. We have attempted to s~ek 
pragmatic solutions based on philosophical and moral reflection. We consider 
that the human embryo must be respected as a potential person, and this 
reasoning has earned us both praise and criticism. It seems that in Great Britain, 
this t~xt is considered unclear. We clearly sought to break with a certain scientific 
ideology held by researchers. And we drew the attention of the government to 
the need for effective control over research; we lack the means for such control, 
as our authority is only moral. We have no idea what is transpiring in the 
laboratories right now, and, indeed, perhaps it is better we do not know! 
While there is no time here to enter into a closer analysis of these documents, 
I would simply like to emphasize one theoretical point. We can most certainly 
balance the risks and advantages of research, and we can evaluate the scientific 
validity and finality of this research. If we approve it, however, we will probably 
not be capable of controlling the applications, even if we refuse to accord patents 
to genetic manipulation of human beings. But above all, we must not remain 
imprisoned by a utilitarianism that reduces human life to an object. 
We therefore believe that the defense of the principle of humanity requires 
postulates that cannot be demonstrated, similar to legal fictions. The law, like 
art, employs artifices and fictions which impart meaning to reality and which 
reconstruct reality by forging symbolic representations. The loss of such sym-
bolic references may well be what makes the definition of law so difficult in this 
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area. What is more, if fictions are to be chosen, they must be good fictions. 
They must be those that will favor the freedom of the future child and block 
the powerful fantasy of the perfect child, an illusion maintained by science 
which genetic engineering could turn into a reality.4 But who in our society 
holds the power and possesses the art of enunciating these standards, these 
fictions, and these categories of law? 
IV. THE INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF BIOETHICS 
I would like to touch briefly on two further subjects of reflection. The first is 
a constitutional problem, and the second is a problem of formal coordination 
between different sources of law. 
From a constitutional standpoint, the French Parliament enjoys exclusive 
competence for drawing up laws, including civil and criminal law. Likewise, 
only the courts have jurisdiction in these areas. Without laws, therefore, ethics 
committees can only, in principle, make pronouncements in conformity with 
positive law. But since this positive law remains undetermined, insufficient, or 
poorly adapted, the National Ethics Committee can, as a consultative body, 
recommend that the legislative body intervene. The Committee has made such 
recommendations, but at the same time has found it necessary to go even 
further, and, albeit in the form of recommendations, it has set forth rules of 
conduct for legislative domains. Certain critics have accused the Committee of 
infringing upon the competence and jurisdiction of legislators and the courts. 
The difficulty involved, however, is much more profound and concerns the 
very nature of the regulations. Are laws necessary or would flexible directives 
without compulsory measures be sufficient? Here, too, the question has been 
hotly debated. The medical and scientific community favors self-regulation, 
possibly subject to discussion by ethics committees. But others note correctly 
that when human rights and the status of persons are at stake, doctors and 
researchers must not establish de facto laws through their practices and thus 
present both society and the Parliament with a fait accompli. 
A solution to the conflict might be forthcoming in a harmonization of formal 
rules, both civil and criminal, and philosophical adaptations under the control 
of ethics committees which would be integrated within the judicial order. Under 
these terms, it is the very status of the law in terms of its relationship with 
morality and deontology that must be reexamined. 
The definition of law also requires that one avoid excessive incoherence within 
the existing judicial system. We are experiencing this difficulty at the Council 
of State. We must strive to assure compatibility with civil law, commercial law, 
4 See J. BAUDOUIN & C. LABRUSSE-RIOU, PRODUIRE L'HOMME: DE QUEL DROIT?, COLLECTION LES VOlES 
DU DROIT (1987). 
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social and administrative law, and criminal law. To achieve this, one needs 
common points of reference, a firm ethical perspective, and the art of combining 
the values of these ethics. Even though we are working within a relative domain, 
the law, insofar as it expresses an ethic, must present itself as an absolute. 
Otherwise, it is reduced simply to a bureaucratic quest~on and divested of all 
thought behind the action. It is the thought and this art of judging that we 
hope will result from our shared and arduous work.s 
The lesson of humility for both the biologist and the jurist is that given by 
Hamlet, a lesson that calls to mind the Chakrabarty decision handed down by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in 1980 concerning the patenting of genetic material: 
sometimes it is better to "endure the ills we have than to fly towards others that 
we know not of."6 But this lesson does not exclude that put forth by Albert 
Camus, which is the hope, or the faith, that we can "serve human dignity 
through means which remain worthy in the course of an unworthy history." 
5 B. EDELMAN, M. HERMITT, & C. LABRUSSE-RIOU, L'HOMME, LA NATURE, ET LE DROIT (C. Bourgois 
ed. 1988). 
6 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 316 (1980) (Burger, C. J., quoting Hamlet, Act III, sc. I, I. 
81). 
